AMIR'S SESSION - ADDITIONAL NOTES

1st tape

$n = 2$

$$V_1(s_1, s_2) > V_2(s_1, s_2)$$

(s_1: winner)

1 should pay: $V_1(s_1^*, s_2) = V_2(s_1^*, s_2)$

$V_1(s_1, \cdot)$ $\quad$ $V_2(\cdot, s_2)$

If buyer 1 wins, gets

$$V_1(s_1, s_2) - V_2(s_1^*, s_2)$$

let us suppose: $\frac{\partial V_1}{\partial s_1} > \frac{\partial V_2}{\partial s_1} \geq 0$

$$V_1(s_1, s_2) - V_2(s_1^*, s_2) > 0 \iff s_1 > s_1^*$$

$$\Leftarrow V_1(s_1, s_2) > V_2(s_1, s_2)$$

truthful bidding is ex-post Bayesian Equilibrium.

	m_2	m_2'
m_1		
m_1'	✗	

$(m_1, m_2) \leftarrow \theta$

$(m_1', m_2') \leftarrow \theta'$

menage (m_1', m_2) : θ or θ' ?