Giuseppe De Feo obtained his MA and is expected to get his PhD (December 2007) from the Université catholique de Louvain. He received his BA in Economics and his first PhD from the Università di Napoli Federico II.
Giuseppe’s interests are in the fields of Applied Microeconomic Theory, Industrial Organization and Public Economics. There are three basic, interrelated themes in his research activity: (i) the functioning of markets with strategic interaction among firms; (ii) the effect of imperfect information on the efficiency of competitive markets; and (iii) the scope for public intervention in presence of market imperfections. In particular, the analysis of markets under asymmetric information, merger and antitrust issues, and oligopoly theory, are the main topics of his papers and research in progress. Oligopoly theory is also at the basis of his current research on policy competition for FDI.
In his job market paper, the effect of asymmetric information on insurance markets is analyzed. It is show that adverse selection is in general worse under competition than under monopoly. The reason is that monopoly can exploit its market power to relax incentive constraints by cross-subsidization between different risk types. An empirical validation of these results is encompassed in his future research agenda, along with the application of the same methodology to financial and credit markets and to models of moral hazard.
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